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This power over the purse may, in fact, be regardedas the
most complete and effectual weapon with which any
constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the
people,for obtaininga redress of every grievance, andfor
carryinginto effect every just and salutarymeasure.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1998 the United States Supreme Court and the South
Carolina Supreme Court waded into the struggle between their respective
executive and legislative branches for budgetary control. At the center of the
fray stood the line item veto, which allows the executive to intervene in the
legislature's most significant power-the power to appropriate money.?
Though both courts ultimately repudiated their executives' actions, the
distinction between the issues in controversy was clear. The federal line item

1. THE FEDERALISTNO. 58, at 350 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
2. See Antony R.Petrilla, Note, The Role ofthe Line-Item Veto in the FederalBalance
ofPower, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469,475 (1994).
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veto was a new power, and the United States Supreme Court had to determine
where, if at all, that power fit within our constitutional system. In contrast, the
line item veto is well established at the state level; however, its implementation
varies amongjurisdictions. The South Carolina Supreme Court faced the task
of placing the state's item veto on a continuum of options, at either end of
which rested the continuing authority of opposing branches of government to
determine the content of spending bills.
At the federal level, President Bill Clinton sought to exercise a
congressional extension of his constitutional veto power for the first time by
striking an appropriations provision that would have waived, among other
things, Medicaid expenses due from New York City. 3 In canceling the
President's action, the Supreme Court held that the Line Item Veto Acte
allowed the President "to create a different law" through a procedure foreign
to the dictates of Article I, Section 7 of the United States Constitution. 5 The
Court noted that such a change in the role of the branches must come from a
constitutional amendment, not a statute. 6
In South Carolina Governor David Beasley tested the bounds of his
established line item veto power by selectively editing five separate budgetary
provisions.7 Although not provoking the dramatic confrontation seen at the
federal level, his action, if sustained by the court, would have expanded the
powers already granted through Article IV, Section 21 of the South Carolina
Constitution. The court turned back the Governor's striking of "sentences,
words and phrases," holding that "the Governor can only veto those parts
labeled by the legislature as items or sections."' The justification for this
decision rested on grounds similar to the federal decision, which was the
unsupportable encroachment of the executive into territory reserved for the
legislature.9
Both courts found that the chief executives had overstepped their
constitutional authority by exercising a legislative type of authority that altered
legislation, rather than simply voiding it. While the restored spending
provisions no doubt brought much reliefto their beneficiaries, the rulings more
significantly affirmed the legislatures' preeminence in setting budgetary
priorities. The purpose of this Comment is to explore the foundation and
nuances of the state decision. While the federal issue has been tabled pending
a constitutional amendment, conflicts at the state level occur every time the
chief executive attempts to exert authority under a liberal interpretation of the
power. The followingParts ofthis Comment summarize South Carolina's item

3. Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2095-96 (1998).

4. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-92 (Supp. 111996).
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Clinton, 118 S.Ct. at 2108.
Id.
Drummond v. Beasley, 331 S.C. 559, 503 S.E.2d 455 (1998) (per curiam).
Id. at 564, 503 S.E.2d at 457.
See id.
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veto history; analyze other state interpretations of constitutional line item veto
provisions; and propose guidelines that focus on the textual, contextual, and
functional properties of line items within spending bills.

II.BACKGROUND
The progression of South Carolina case law focuses on refining the degree
of latitude the Governor possesses to alter appropriations bills. The South
Carolina Constitution establishes the Governor's line item veto authority as
follows:
Bills appropriating money out of the Treasury shall
specify the objects and purposes for which the same are
made, and appropriate to them respectively their several
amounts in distinct items and sections. If the Governor shall
not approve any one or more of the items or sections
contained in any bill appropriating money, but shall approve
of the residue thereof, it shall become a law as to the residue
in like manner as if he had signed it. The Governor shall then
return the bill with his objections to the items or sections of
the same not approved by him to the house in which the bill
originated ......
Drummond v. Beasley was the latest interpretation of the line item veto by
the South Carolina Supreme Court. The court laid the foundation for its current
construction in the 1960 decision Cox v. Bates," which addressed the
fundamental issue of what constitutes an item. The decision involved a
taxpayer challenge to an educational reserve fund to be drawn from excess
revenues. The taxpayers alleged that the statute did not properly delineate
appropriations for each of the counties into items and sections. 2 The court
upheld the legislation, stating that "'[t]he requirement of itemization is to be
given a common sense construction, and the statement of a single appropriate
general purpose may be sufficient, although there are many items, particularly
where it is difficult to determine in advance the exact amount of each of the
items.."".3 The principle guiding the decision was that "distinct items and
sections" were more easily severable by the Governor for veto purposes
"without affecting the validity of other appropriations."' 4 This "common

10. S.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 21.
11. 237 S.C. 198, 116 S.E.2d 828 (1960).
12. Id. at 216, 116 S.E.2d at 835. Note that Cox was not a veto case. Instead, it
addressed the General Assembly's obligation to organize appropriations bills in sections to
facilitate review by the Governor.
13. Id. at 218, 116 S.E.2d at 836-37 (quoting 81A C.J.S. States § 237c (1977)).
14. Id. at 220, 116 S.E.2d at 837.
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sense" rule would guide the court as it considered subsequent modifications of
budget items in the context of Article IV, Section 21.
A series of line item veto challenges arose during the Beasley
administration. The South Carolina Supreme Court considered the first two
simultaneously in 1995. Williams v. Morris" arose out of a squabble between
Comptroller General Earl Morris and Senator Marshall Williams over the
disbursement of funds to cover interim expenses for the Senate. That year the
General Assembly had adjournedpriorto receiving Governor Beasley's vetoes,
one of which struck the interim expenses in question. 6 The court rejected
Senator Williams's challenge, though it recognized that "the grant of veto
power to the Governor must be strictly construed."' 7 Given this strict
construction, the constitutional veto power must be upheld in a manner that
preserves the Governor's participation in the legislative process.' 8 The court
blocked the General Assembly from circumventing that power by passing
legislation at the end of the session and adjourning before the Governor's fiveday period for consideration lapsed.' 9 Significantly, had the court upheld
Senator Williams's challenge, the General Assembly would have gained the
power to spend money not approved by the Governor simply by adjourning
before he could return a veto message.2"
On the same day as Williams the court issued an opinion concerning a
challenge by the South Carolina Coin Operators Association to Governor
Beasley's veto of provisions affecting the "regulation and licensing of video
slot machines."'" Specifically, the Governor vetoed parts of section 67 of the
1995-96 Appropriations Act, but not the whole.22 In upholding the Governor's
veto message in Coin Operators,the court stated:
The Executive power of veto is ordinarily exercised only with
respect to the whole of a bill or joint resolution[,] but with
15. 320 S.C. 196, 464 S.E.2d 97 (1995) (per curiam).

16. Id. at 197-98, 464 S.E.2d at 98.
17. Id. at 206, 464 S.E.2d at 102.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 199, 464 S.E.2d at 98.
21. South Carolina Coin Operators Ass'n v. Beasley, 320 S.C. 183, 185, 464 S.E.2d
103, 103 (1995) (per curiam).
22. Governor Beasley's Veto Message Number 97 stated:
Iam vetoing Item (B) which provides for licensing of
'Video Slot Machines'; Item (C)(1) which increases
the biennial license fees; Item (E) which allows for
eight machines, eliminates minimum gross proceeds
and extends video poker operation until 2:00 AM
Sundays; Item (F) which repeals limited cash payouts; and, Item (H) which permits counties to impose
a business license tax on gross income in addition to
the license fee.
Coin Operators,320 S.C. at 185, 464 S.E.2d at 104.
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reference to bills appropriating money from the State treasury
the constitution expressly makes an exception to the rule and
as to them the veto may go to any items or sections without
impairing the residue23

Significantly, the court examined the post-veto "residue" to ensure that the
essence of the legislation had not been lost. Finding that the integrity of the bill
remained, the court allowed the veto message to stand.24
Armed with this seeming vindication, the Governor again moved to strike
portions of an appropriations bill in Drummond v. Beasley.2" This time,
however, the court declined to extend the executive's veto power. After first
characterizing the language of Coin Operatorspertaining to the line item veto
as "dicta, ' 26 the court subsequently held that "the Governor can only veto those
parts labeled by the legislature as items or sections," insofar as to do otherwise27
would "not meet the common sense construction of an item or section."
Importantly, the court distinguished Coin Operators,which addressed the
deletion of subsections, with the present case, in which the Governor struck
sentences, words, and phrases, which are all smaller units than subsections.2"
In analyzing this more particular form of the item veto, the South Carolina
Supreme Court looked to decisions from other states for guidance.2 9 Extensive
case law from Iowa, along with examples from New Mexico and Colorado,
supported a restrictive view of the item veto power that did not include the
ability to delete fragments of items.3" Finding ample support for its decision,
the court proscribed any item veto striking units smaller than those found in
Coin Operators.3 '
The preceding review of South Carolina case law clearly supports the
assertion that the supreme court plays an integral role in maintaining the

23. Id. at 187,464 S.E.2d at 105 (quoting Parker v. Bates, 216 S.C. 52,71, 56 S.E.2d
723,731 (1949)).
24. Id. at 187-88, 464 S.E.2d at 105.
25. 331 S.C. 559, 503 S.E.2d 455 (1998) (per curiam). Senator Drummond
challenged vetoes 5, 6, 11, 19, and 20, which respectively concerned fee increases by the
Department of Health and Environmental Control, guidelines for the use of appropriated funds
by the Department of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Services Chemical Dependency Programs, the
Ethics Commission authorization to investigate maintenance logs of state-owned aircraft, an
effective date for video poker legislation, and a provision requiring "the advice and consent of
the Senate" in conjunction with the Drug Awareness Resistance Education Fund. Id. at 560 n. 1,
503 S.E.2d at 456 n.l.
26. Id. at 563, 503 S.E.2d at 457.
27. Id. at 564, 503 S.E.2d at 457.
28. Id. at 562, 503 S.E.2d at 456.
29. Id. at 563, 503 S.E.2d at 457.
30. See Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1985); Colton v.
Branstad, 372 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1985); Rush v. Ray, 362 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1985); Welden v.
Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1975); State ex rel. Coll v. Carruthers, 759 P.2d 1380 (N.M. 1988)
(per curiam).
31. Drummond, 331 S.C. at 564, 503 S.E.2d at 457.
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balance between the executive and legislative branches regarding the
appropriation ofmoney. This function is not unique to South Carolina's courts.
As the case studies that follow demonstrate, courts play a vital role in
determining the extent to which the legislature's control of the purse strings is
limited by the executive's item veto.
III. CASE STUDIES: IOWA, WISCONSIN, AND VIRGINIA

While the line item veto is a novelty at the federal level, the constitutions
of forty-three states contain provisions allowing their chief executives to strike
portions of legislation.32 Considering the exercise of this power by some
govemors along with the subsequent challenges by the legislatures and
eventual adjudication by the courts, the judiciary clearly plays a critical role in
maintaining the relationship between its fellow branches of government. The
following state-based case summaries illustrate the significant difference in
how this power shrinks or grows depending on the outlook of the courts. Each
state is included for a specific reason. Iowa has extensive case history
addressing a veto structured similarly to South Carolina's. Wisconsin provides
an example of court decisions that are highly deferential to the Governor,
resulting in the accumulation of spending power in the executive branch.
Finally, Virginia's inclusion rests on its status as a fellow southern state and the
much-cited precedent contained in Commonwealth v. Dodson.33 The
circumstances surrounding these cases form the foundation for the analysis in
Part IV.
A. Iowa
The South Carolina Supreme Court looked to Iowa precedent for guidance
in the Drummond decision. 34 Though not mentioned in Drummond, Iowa's
constitutional mechanism for the exercise of the item veto was similar to South
Carolina's. 3 Also, both courts had to confront a nontraditional assertion of the
item veto power- namely, the excision of portions of appropriations that had

32. State ex reL Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 424 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Wis. 1988).
33. 11 S.E.2d 120 (Va. 1940).
34. See Drummond,331 S.C. at 563, 503 S.E.2d at 457.
35. Iowa's constitution provides:

The governor may approve appropriation bills in
whole or in part, and may disapprove any item of an
appropriation bill; and the part approved shall

become a law. Any item of an appropriation bill
disapproved by the governor shall be
returned .... Any such item of an appropriation bill
may be enacted into law notwithstanding the
governor's objections, in the same manner as
provided for other bills.
IOWA CONST. art. III, § 16.
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not been classified by the legislature as distinct items.
The landmark decision of Welden v. Ray, 6 established that provisions
which were not "separate" and "severable" from lawful appropriations were
"beyond the scope" of the Governor's item veto authority. 37 The items in
question allocated funds for the Iowa Commission on Alcoholism, the
3
Department of Social Services, and the Office for Economic Opportunity. 1
Significantly, the court stated that "if the Governor desires to veto a
legislatively-imposed qualification upon an appropriation, he must veto the
accompanying appropriation as well."39 This was a clear delineation between
the legitimate act of striking entire portions of a bill and the prohibited act of
selectively excising part of the bill. Quoting language that would establish the
standard by which the court would measure future item vetoes, the court said
"'the item veto power does not contemplate striking out conditions and
restrictionsalone as items,for that would be affirmative legislation,whereas
4
thegovernor's veto power is a strictly negativepower, nota creativepower.' o
In 1985 State Senator George Rush challenged Governor Robert Ray's
striking of a phrase, from five appropriations bills, that precluded the transfer
of funds between provisions.41 The Iowa Supreme Court found that this
provision was not subject to Governor Ray's item veto authority, nor was it an
intrusion on his executive power.42 Central to the decision was the judgment
that the provisions in each of the bills were "qualifications," not "item[s], ' 43 a
finding consistent with that of Welden.
The same court turned back a challenge by the General Assembly in a
decision issued five months later. In Colton v. Branstada the Iowa Supreme
Court held that the Governor's deletion of a rider" provision in an
appropriations bill was a constitutional exercise of his item veto authority.46
The opinion, quoting language from a Louisiana case, stated:
Just as the Governor may not use his item-veto power to

36. 229 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1975).
37. Id. at 715.
38. Id. at 707-09.
39. Id. at 713.
40. Id. (quoting Don Muyskens, Note, Item Veto Amendment to the Iowa Constitution,
18 DRAKE L. REv. 245, 249-50 (1969)).
41. See Rush v. Ray, 362 N.W.2d 479, 480 (Iowa 1985). The phrases each read
substantially as follows: "[F]unds appropriated by this Act shall not be subject to transfer or
expenditure for any purpose other than the purposes specified." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 372 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1985).
45. A "rider" is "[a] clause, usually having little relevance to the main issue, added
to a legislative bill." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1062 (2d College ed. 1985).

46. Colton, 372 N.W.2d at 192. The rider under consideration gave the Family
Planning Counsel authority to distribute federal funds to local family planning agencies. The
overall appropriation allocated money to the Department of Health. See id. at 186-87.
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usurp constitutional powers conferred on the legislature,
neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the
constitutional powers conferred on him as the chief executive
officer of the state by including in a general appropriation bill
matters more properly enacted in separate legislation.47
In summary the Iowa Supreme Court followed a deliberate course of
adjudicating interbranch conflicts in strict accordance with the language of
Article III, Section 16 of the Iowa Constitution. The clearly drawn distinction,
mirrored in Drummond, allows the wholesale striking of specific, intact items
while disallowing the deletion of select conditions within these items. The
Iowa court's efforts to maintain a careful balance between the branches contrast
markedly with Wisconsin's generous rendering of the Governor's item veto
power.
B. Wisconsin

Interpretation of Wisconsin's line item veto provision" has been
deferential to the Governor, largely due to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's49
expansive view of the meaning of the word "part" in the state constitution.
47. Id. at 190 (quoting Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153, 157-58 (La. 1977)).
48. "Appropriation bills may be approved in whole or in part by the governor, and
the part approved shall become law, and the part objected to shall be returned in the same
manner as provided for other bills." WIS. CONST. art. V, § 10.
49. See State ex rel.Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 424 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Wis. 1988).
Moreover, in State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Henry, 260 N.W. 486, 491 (Wis. 1935),
the court averred:
[I]f, in conferring partial veto power . . . it was
intended to give the executive such power only in
respect to an item or part of an item in an
appropriation bill, then why was not some such term
as either "item" or "part of an item" embodied in that
amendment . . . instead of using the plain and
unambiguous terms "part" and "part of the bill
objected to,"without anywords qualifying orlimiting
the well-known meaning and scope of the word
"part"? As the meaning of that word, as used in
section 10, art. 5, Wis. Const., is not thus qualified or
limited, or otherwise rendered doubtful by reason of
context, or uncertainty as to application to a particular
subject-matter, or otherwise, there is nothing because
of which that word, as used in that section, is not to
be given its usual, customary, and accepted meaning,
which.., is "one of the portions, equal or unequal,
into which anything is divided, or regarded as
divided; something less than a whole; a number,
quantity, mass, or the like . . . whether actually
separate or not; a piece, fragment, fraction, member,
or constituent."
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Finding a semantic difference between the words "part" and "item," the court's
decisions give the Governor broad latitude in striking fragments of
appropriations bills,5" a policy both Iowa and South Carolina specifically
reject. " As a result, Wisconsin's Governor wields significant influence over
the final structure and content of that state's appropriations bills.
The court's first look at the constitution's item veto provision occurred in
State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Henry, 2 in which a telephone
company challenged the law's validity because the Governor vetoed "provisos
or conditions inseparably connected ...and... integral" to the rest of the
bill.53 Underlying the company's claim was its effort to avoid paying taxes
which might be invalid:
[I]f [the plaintiffs] make payment of taxes under the bill and
it should be held that it never became a law because [it was]
not enacted and published in the manner required by the
Constitution and statutes of Wisconsin, then the plaintiff and
such other taxpayers would be without any remedy because
the provisions of the bill for the recovery of the taxes so paid
would be invalid as law ....
The courtheld that the Governor was free to veto parts of abill, deferring to the
legislature only where the language of the act indicates that it is to stand as a
whole. 5 Though this conclusion might exceed the mandate of the original
amendment, "there is nothing in that provision which warrants the inference or
conclusion that the Governor's power of partial veto was not intended to be as
coextensive as the Legislature's power to join and enact separable pieces of
legislation in an appropriation bill.""6 The court, rather than adhering to a strict
view of separate duties for separate branches, viewed the Governor of
Wisconsin as a significant player in the formulation of legislation.
Subsequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the validity of a bill
approved only in part by the Governor after the adjournment of the
legislature." At issue was whether the remnant was a viable law." The
Secretary of State thought that it was not and refused to publish the bill, which
50. See Thompson, 424 N.W.2d at 388.
51. See Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706, 713 (Iowa 1975); Drummond v. Beasley,
331 S.C. 559, 563-64, 503 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1998) (per curiam).
52. 260 N.W. 486 (Wis. 1935).
53. Id. at488.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 492.
56. Id.
57. Such an adjournment is often referred to by the term sine die, which means
"without assigning a day for a further meeting orhearing." BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY 1385 (6th
ed. 1990). For a sine die case in South Carolina, see Williams v. Morris, 320 S.C. 196, 464
S.E.2d 97 (1995) (per curiam).
58. State ex rel.Martin v. Zimmerman, 289 N.W. 662, 663-64 (Wis. 1940).
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appropriated money to the state department of public welfare for aid for
dependent children. 9 As a result, the Secretary refused to transfer the funds.6"
The court looked to the purpose of the item veto, which was "to prevent, if
possible, the adoption of omnibus appropriation bills, log-rolling, the practice
of jumbling together in one act inconsistent subjects," in upholding the
Governor's actions. 6' Despite the notion that the edited version of the bill
"effectuate[d] a change in policy," the parts left intact "constitute[d] an
effective and enforceable law on fitting subjects for a separate enactment by the
legislature. '62
Building on the Governor's court-sanctioned power to amend legislation,
a 1978 decision, State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta,63 confirmed the principle that
the chief executive's veto authority allowed him to change a bill's underlying
policy. In Conta the bill in question allowed taxpayers to contribute to the
Wisconsin Election Campaign Fund through a check-offprovision on their tax
returns.6 The Governor transformed this provision into an obligation for the
state's general fund by deleting two essential phrases. 65 Applying the principle
of severability, which indicates that the vetoed portion may be excised while
leaving a "complete, workable bill," the court declared the Governor's
modified version a valid law. 66 "Under the Wisconsin Constitution, the
governor may exercise his partial-veto power by removing provisos and
conditions to an appropriation so long as the net result of the partial veto is a
complete, entire, and workable bill which the legislature itself could have
passed in the first instance. 67 Whether the legislature would have passed such
a bill was not a factor in the analysis.
Most recently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Governor could
exercise partial veto power to veto "phrases, digits, letters, and word
fragments."6" In State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson members of the
state legislature challenged Governor Tommy Thompson's deletion of subelements contained in the 1987-89 biennial budget bill. 69 Relying on the

59. Id. at 663.
60. Id.

61. Id. at 664.
62. Id. at 665.
63. 264 N.W.2d 539 (Wis. 1978).
64. Id. at 540.

65. Id. at 541. The bill stated: "Every individual filing an income tax statement may
designate that their income tax liability be increased by S1 for deposit into the Wisconsin
Election Campaign Fund forthe use ofeligible candidates unders. 11.50." Id. (emphasis added).
Deletion ofthe italicized phrases negated the increase, thereby altering the underlying legislative
policy. Id. Although the bill would have still allocated money to the election fund, it would
have done so through tax revenues on hand, not through a tax increase of one dollar, which was
the legislature's original plan.
66. Id. at 542.
67. Id. at 555.
68. State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 424 N.W.2d 385, 386 (Wis. 1988).
69. Id.
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principle established in Kleczka, the decision allowed any editing that left "a

complete, entire, and workable law., 70 In language that left no doubt as to the
Governor's role in formulating legislation, the court stated that "what the
71

legislature has assembled, the Governor can disassemble 'part' by 'part."'

The result is that Wisconsin's Governor possesses legislative power unique in
the sweep of its application. "This broad and expansive interpretation of the
governor's partial veto authority as mandated by the constitution has, in effect,
impelled this court's rejection of any separation of powers-type argument that
the governor cannot affirmatively legislate by the use of the partial veto
power.""2 The only limitation levied was the requirement of "germaneness,"

or that "all of the new provisions resulting from those vetoes involve the same
subject matter as the original legislative enactment."'73 Essentially, this
limitation imposed the lenient restriction that the Governor could not create an
entirely new bill by deleting core phrases without which the central purpose of
the original legislation would be lost. The scope of this interpretation 74 is
essentially the radical extension of executive power rejected by the South

Carolina Supreme Court in Drummond.
C. Virginia

Virginia occupies a place on the item veto continuum slightly more
deferential to the executive than Iowa but much less so than Wisconsin. Item
veto jurisprudence in Virginia rests on two principle cases. In the first,
Commonwealth v. Dodson," the court had to interpret language in the state

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 388.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 394.
Id.
The Wisconsin court did include the following caveat:
We refrain from resolving in this opinion the
petitioners' claim that some of the challenged vetoes
are invalid because the resulting provisions are
inartful, clumsy, ungrammatical or incomprehensible.
We note, however, that the test applied to determine
the validity of the governor's partial vetoes is not one
of grammar. The only requirement is that the result
remaining after the partial veto is a "complete and
workable law."
Id. at 398 (quoting State ex reL Kleczka v. Conta, 264 N.W.2d 539, 551 (Wis. 1978) (footnote
omitted)).
75. 11 S.E.2d 120 (Va. 1940). This case is another sine die case in which the
Governor eventually returned a veto message excising spending provisions addressing the
following subjects: (1) employment and compensation of lawyers in the attorney general's office,
(2) election and compensation of the legislative director, (3) compensation of the legislative
director's employees, (4) administration of the State Planning Board, (5) operation of a boat by
the Commission of Fisheries, (6) compensation of various state officers, and (7) production of
information by heads of state agencies. Id. at 130-31.
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constitution proscribing the modification of appropriations bills through the
excision of certain objectionable portions.76 The Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals hinged its holding on a refinement of the term "item," specifically,
whether "conditions or restrictions" on an appropriation constituted items
subject to being struck under the Governor's constitutional veto authority."
First, the court determined that an item refers to a part of a bill which can
be separated "without affecting its other purposes or provisions."" The court
further limited the Governor's authority by excluding qualifications and
directives contained within spending measures:
"It follows conclusively that where the veto power is
attempted to be exercised to object to a paragraph or portion
of a bill other than an item or items, or to language qualifying
an appropriation or directing the method of its uses, he
exceeds the constitutional authority vested in him, and his
objection to such paragraph, or portion of a bill, or language
qualifying an appropriation, or directing the method of its
use, becomes non-effective."79
This portion of the holding sought to limit the Governor's ability to modify
appropriations through the revision of conditional language while leaving the
allocation intact.
Finally, the court defined an "item" contained in an appropriation bill as
"an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose."8 It further
specified that conditions were inherent to the item and must either be observed
or struck down according to the fate of the bill-they did not stand alone."'
The justices eventually found that six of the seven vetoes were not authorized
by the Virginia Constitution, primarily because
they failed to meet the
82
definition of "item" articulated in the decision.
In a later decision, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the Governor's veto
of part of a mass transit appropriation, drawing the distinction once again
between an "item" and a "condition." 3 The appropriation in question allocated
five million dollars per year for capital costs incurred in developing the rail
portion of a mass transit system that also included a bus service and parking

76. "The Governor shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object."
VA. CONST. art. V,

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

§ 6(d).

Dodson, I I S.E.2d at 127.
Id. at 124.
Id. (quoting Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410, 414 (1937)).
Id. at 127.
See id.
Id. at 130-31.
Brault v. Holleman, 230 S.E.2d 238 (Va. 1976).
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facilities.' The Governor struck only the rail portion." The court considered
"the question whether the Metro Rail appropriation is an 'item' within the
meaning of Article V, Section 6 of the Virginia Constitution and thus subject
to the Governor's power of veto. ' 6
The petitioners argued that this "unified transit system" constituted a single
budgetary item that could not be vetoed apart from the parking lot and bus
allocations.8 The court, relying heavily on Dodson, recited the criterion that
an item "is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose" which
must be struck as a whole, including any attached conditions. 88 Petitioners
further urged that if the struck and preserved provisions were so related that
they were legally "tied up," then they constituted a single item.89 The court
rejected this argument, preferring the idea that the purposes of the provisions
must be "intrinsically" linked, not merely "extrinsically" related. 90 The five
million dollar rail appropriation, which represented "an indivisible sum of
money dedicated to a stated purpose," sufficiently satisfied the separability test
of Dodson to sustain the veto.9'
IV. ANALYSIS

Before addressing the issue at the core of this analysis, which is the
analytical framework through which the state line item veto should be
interpreted by the courts, it is worth distinguishing the exercise of the item
vetoes at the state and national levels, as mentioned in Part I. Despite the
contemporaneity ofDrummond v. Beasley and Clinton v. City ofNew York, the
foundation for the decisions differed significantly. At the state level, the South
Carolina Supreme Court addressed the Governor's interpretation and use of an
existing power, contemplated by state framers and integrated into the legislative
process through explicit constitutional procedures. At the national level, the
United States Supreme Court faced an entirely new executive power which
would fundamentally alter a legislative process9" established by the

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 241.
Id.
Id. at 240 (footnote omitted).
Id. at241.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 243.

90. Id.

91. Id. at 243-44. Regarding the separability test, the court stated: "Ifit is clear from
the appropriation bill that, with the disapproved provision eliminated, the approved
appropriations cannot effectively serve their intended purposes, the attempted elimination is
invalid." Id. at 244.
92. Proponents at the national level posit that granting the chief executive some
budgetary control through the item veto would (1) "reduce wasteful spending," (2) "help balance
the budget," and (3) "bring sunshine to the budget process." Alexis Simendinger, The Line-Item
Veto and a Quarter.... 29 NAT'L J. 1384, 1384 (1997). Conversely, critics assert that the line
item veto would be a political bargaining tool used to protect the executive's pet projects, that
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Presentment Clause.9" This potential change resulted from a statute extraneous
to the text of the Constitution itself.94

Although drawing an analogy between governments at the state and
national levels is tempting, the organization and structure of the two differ
significantly. Many state governments are designed to facilitate coordination
between the legislative and executive branches in formulating appropriations
bills, and their budget procedures reflect this. For example, these bills are often
organized in distinct sections or items to allow the Governor to assess separate
provisions individually. Congressional spending bills are not submitted this
way. The prevalence of state item vetoes also has led to a well-informed state
judiciary that has managed to formulate "a coherent and principled approach
to monitoring the scope of item veto power." 95 So when the courts address the
item veto at the state level, they are considering a power fundamental to the
functioning of the budget process. This stands in contrast to the national item
veto, ,which is essentially a legislative effort to circumvent a constitutional
process sometimes characterized by inefficiency and waste.96
Ideally, refinement ofthe line item veto at the state level should encourage
fiscal discipline while minimizing the potential for abuse of power. In at least
one state, part of the motivation for including the line item veto was to provide
the Governor with a check over legislative excesses:
[The line item veto's] purpose was to prevent, if possible, the
adoption of omnibus appropriation bills, log-rolling, the
practice ofjumbling together in one act inconsistent subjects
in order to force a passage by uniting minorities with different
interests when the particular provisions could not pass on
their separate merits, with riders of objectionable legislation
attached to general appropriation bills in order to force the
governor to veto the entire bill and thus stop the wheels of
government or approve the obnoxious act. Very definite evils
were inherent in the law-making processes in connection with
appropriation measures. Both the legislature and the people
deemed it advisable to confer power upon the governor to
approve appropriation bills in whole or in part ....
9'
On the other hand, chief executives are also prone to abusing the privileges

the projects cut would be relatively insignificant, and that the apparent placing ofaccountability
would be masked by back-channel shenanigans. See id.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
2.
94. See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2094 (1998).
95. Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, How Successfully Can the States' Item Veto be
Transferredto the President?, 75 GEO. L.J. 159, 162 (1986).
96. See generallySimendinger, supra note 92, at 1384 (discussing the motivation
behind the enactment of the national line item veto).
97. State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 289 N.W. 662, 664 (Wis. 1940).
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granted them by their state charters. While the language quoted above focuses
on the excesses of the legislature and the need to curb those excesses with an
effective governor, the best check on the ambitions of the branches is a system
in balance. That balance is ill-served by a dominant executive, as noted by the
Supreme Court of New Mexico in State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick.98 In that

decision, the court emphasized that the Governor's veto authority was not
"absolute" in the sense that it could be exercised free of "any restraint or
limitation whatsoever." 99 Abroad, unmitigated item veto wouldbe inconsistent

with a system based on checks and balances and "the fundamental principle
that.., no man is completely above the law.'.. If recent history is any guide,
the balance of power at the state level rests largely on the shoulders of the
courts, especially at a time when chief executives seem prone to testing the
limits of their constitutional authority. Three basic, interconnected ideas
consistently inform the decisions of the state courts. First is the definition of
"item." The scope of the definition determines how exacting the governor may
be in deleting portions of bills. Second is how strictly the principle of
"severability" is enforced, which requires the deleted portion to be lifted from
the bill cleanly and intact. The final consideration is whether the court
philosophically separates the legislative function into creation and deletion for
the legislature and governor, respectively. A governor who vetoes the most
minute details of provisions inevitably passes from the negation of existing
legislation into the formulation of new legislation, often adverse to the intent
of the legislature. The balance of these ideas determines whether the center of
government rests with the executive or with the legislature.
A. Defining "Item" Through Textual Interpretation

Whether the court interprets "item" broadly or narrowly significantly
expands or limits the range of provisions a governor may strike. The courts of
South Carolina and Iowa restrict the item veto to distinct provisions, forcing
any excision to cover the entire measure.'0 ' In contrast, the Wisconsin court
has given its Governor leeway to cross out measures contained within items,
extending down to "phrases, digits, letters, and word fragments."'0 2 In
between, the courts of Virginia limit that state's Governor's veto to distinct
items, but they freely subdivide budget provisions to allow the elimination of
component measures. 3 The adoption of various interpretations is constantly
disputed among the three branches of government in many states. A source of

98. 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974).

99. Id. at 978.
100. Id.
101. See Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706, 713 (Iowa 1975); Drummond v. Beasley,
331 S.C. 559, 564, 503 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1998) (per curiam).
102. State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 424 N.W.2d 385, 386 (Wis. 1988).
103. See Brault v. Holleman, 230 S.E.2d 238, 243-44 (Va. 1976).
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particular contention is whether a governor should be allowed to strike "not
merely appropriation (dollar) items but substantive provisions as well,"
especially "when the legislature intends the substantive provision to act as a
condition or qualification on the appropriated amount." '
Item is commonly defined as it relates to budget provisions within
appropriations bills. Because these provisions often contain non-budgetary
conditions and terms, courts are able to choose between making them intrinsic
or extrinsic to the measure. An intrinsic term is intertwined with the rest of the
section and does not stand as a separate vetoable unit. An extrinsic term stands
alone and is subject to the governor's independent review. West Virginia
distinguishes items based on the subjects they address, even where they
contribute to a total appropriation: "'The term 'item' wherein it relates to the
budget embraces a subject or purpose and an amount." 0 5 The court continued:
"[A]n item may occur as a separate particular in an enumeration, account, or
total, and
may be any separate subject and amount within an account or
'0 6
total.'
Likewise, the Florida courts interpret an item as "'a separate entry in an
account or a schedule, or a separate particular in an enumeration of
a total
07
which is separate and distinct from the other particulars or entries."1
"Whenever the Legislature goes to the extent of saying
...that a specified sum of money raised by taxation shall be
spent for a specified purpose, and that alone, while other
sums mentioned in the bill are to be used otherwise, no matter
what language it may be disguised under, it is, nevertheless,
within both the spirit and letter of the Constitution, an 'item'
within the bill, and may be disapproved by the Governor
without affecting
any other items of appropriation contained
10 8
therein."'
In Dodson the Virginia Supreme Court defined an "item" contained in an
appropriation bill as "an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated
purpose."'0 9 Importantly, the court includes "'language qualifying an
appropriation, or directing the method of its use"' within the item, finding that
the Governor "'exceeds the constitutional authority vested in him"' ifhe strikes

104. Fisher & Devins, supra note 95, at 166.
105. State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 214 S.E.2d 467, 480 (W. Va. 1975)
(quoting State ex rel.Brotherton v. Blankenship, 207 S.E.2d 421,435 (W. Va. 1973)).
106. Id. at481.
107. Green v. Rawls, 122 So. 2d 10, 15 (Fla. 1960) (per curiam) (quoting People ex
rel. State Bd. of Agric. v. Brady, 115 N.E. 204,207 (Ill. 1917)).
108. Id. at 16 (quoting Fairfield v. Foster, 214 P. 319, 323 (Ariz. 1923)).
109. Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E.2d 120, 127 (Va. 1940); see also Henry v.
Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153, 157 (La. 1977) (defining "item" as "a sum of money dedicated to a
specific purpose, a separate fiscal unit").
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this language." ' Finally, the Drummond decision held "[t]he vetoes of
sentences, words and phrases does not meet the common sense construction of
an item or section.' l This finding, though in more general language,
comports with the more precise definitions cited by the courts of Virginia," 2
West Virginia," 3 and Florida," 4 which would likely find such a selective veto
as interfering with the stated purpose or enumeration of a particular provision.
Contrarily, Wisconsin adheres to the exact opposite principle in Thompson,
allowing its Governor to veto "words, letters and digits," though it based the
decision on a construction of the word "part" rather than "item."' 15
B. Severability: The Item in Context
"Item" is sometimes best understood in terms of context. Courts often
impose the condition of "severability" on governors' decisions, which requires
that, after removal, the remaining bill retain no links to the severed piece. As
expressed by the Virginia court, an item is "something which may be taken out
of a bill without affecting its other purposes or provisions." '"1 6 It must be
"lifted" cleanly from the surrounding legislation, so "[n]o damage can be done
to the surrounding legislative tissue, nor should any scar tissue result
therefrom."". Antony R. Petrilla summarizes the concept as follows: "The
section targeted by the item veto must be discrete and it must be expunged
entirely. Its removal must not change the import of any of the remaining
clauses in the legislation."'1 8
The Wisconsin court notes that "[t]he power of the Governor to
disassemble the law is coextensive with the power of the Legislature to
One purpose of the severability
assemble its provisions initially.''
requirement is to facilitate the legislature's subsequent consideration of the
vetoed items.'20 The affected bills must maintain a threshold level of coherence
for this review and must not return to their legislatures fragmented or distorted.
"[I]tems altered by veto should retain sufficient identity of subject or purpose
and amount to permit intelligent review by the Legislature when it reconsiders
veto actions of the Governor."' 2 ' Similarly, the New Mexico Supreme Court

110. Dodson, I1 S.E.2d at 124 (quoting Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S.
410,414 (1937)).
111. Drummond v. Beasley, 331 S.C. 559, 564, 503 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1998) (per
curiam).
112. See supra note 103.
113. See supra note 105.
114. See supra note 107.
115. State ex rel.Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 424 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Wis. 1988).
116. Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E.2d 120, 124 (Va. 1940).
117. Id.
118. Petrilla, supra note 2, at 502.
119. State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 264 N.W.2d 539, 551 (Wis. 1978).
120. See State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 214 S.E.2d 467, 484 (W. Va. 1975).
121. Id.
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states that "a partial veto must be so exercised that it eliminates or destroys the
whole of an item or part and does not distort the legislative intent, and in effect
create legislation inconsistent with that enacted by the Legislature, by the
22
careful striking of words, phrases, clauses or sentences."'
In Brault v. Holleman" the petitioners urged the court to address
severability in its analysis of the Governor's vetoes of the rail portion of an
omnibus transportation bill. They argued that the test should be whether "'the
purpose of an appropriation amount that was vetoed [and] the purpose of an
appropriation amount which was not vetoed"' were "'tied up"' with each
other, 1 24 and, if so, the veto must be overturned. The salient issue in this case
was whether the "'relationship between bus and rail mass transit in the
[northern Virginia] area and between parking facilities at Metro rail stations
and Metro rail lines"' was so "'considerable"' that the veto of the funding for
Metro Rail would "affect seriously the appropriations for bus capital and
parking facilities.' 21 5 The court rejected this argument, concluding that "the
relationship between purposes must appear intrinsically, rather than
extrinsically."' 26 According to the court's test, "[i]f it is clear from the
appropriation bill that, with the disapproved provision eliminated, the approved
appropriations cannot effectively serve their intended purposes, the attempted
27
elimination is invalid."'
Beyond dollar appropriations, courts occasionally view conditions
contained within items as being so intrinsic to the provision that their deletion
compromises the whole. In Rush v. Ray 28 the Iowa Supreme Court turned
back the Governor's attempt to shift funds by selectively removing certain
qualifications, observing that "[t]he vetoed language created conditions,
restricting use of the money to the stated purpose. It is not severable, because
upon excision of this language, the rest of the legislation is affected."' 129
Because removal of the conditions freed the money to be used for purposes
other than the stated purpose, the conditions were not separate items susceptible
to the Governor's veto.' 30 Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court provides a
simple test: "Conditions and limitations properly included in an appropriation
bill must exhibit such a connexity with money items of appropriation that they
logically belong in a schedule of expenditures."' 3'
A clear example of a severable provision is a rider, which is essentially an

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975, 981 (N.M. 1974).
230 S.E.2d 238 (Va. 1976).
Id. at 243 (quoting the petitioners).
Id. (quoting the petitioners).
Id.
Id. at 244.
362 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1985).
Id. at 482.
Id. at 482-83.
Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153, 158 (La. 1977).
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extraneous measure attached to a larger appropriation."' While noting that it
had interpreted the Governor's item veto power strictly in past decisions, the
Louisiana Supreme Court did not view the legislature's attempt to circumvent
this power favorably:
Just as the Governor may not use his item-veto power to
usurp constitutional powers conferred on the legislature,
neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the
constitutional powers conferred on him as the chief executive
officer of the state by including in a general appropriation bill
matters more properly enacted in separate legislation.... The
legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from
executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto
power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general
law measures so that they appear to be true conditions or
limitations on an item of appropriation .... [W]hen the
legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general
appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as "items"
for purposes of the Governor's item veto power over general
appropriation bills.'33
In summary, severability allows governors to eliminate individual items
from bills while requiring that the remaining provisions constitute viable
legislation. Legislative attempts to bypass or challenge this authority by
lumping unrelated provisions into one bill will likely be rejected by the courts
in the face of an item veto. Above all, severability enforces the balance
between participants in the passage of agreed-upon legislation.
C. MaintainingFunctionalityThrough Negation, Not Creation
Just as the concept of "item" was intertwined with the notion of
severability, the extent to which severability is recognized determines where
on the creation/negation continuum a particular state's item veto fits. The more
restrictive a state's veto has become through judicial interpretation, the more
the governor is limited to a purely negative legislative role. However, if the
134
power is applied flexibly to include "words, phrases, clauses or sentences,"'
the edited legislation begins to assume a different character. In that case, the
governor is using the legislature's product to create a new bill. In Braultthe
Virginia Governor transformed a comprehensive transportation bill into
separate appropriations for various transportation services. 35 Similarly, the

132. See Colton v. Branstad, 372 N.W.2d 184, 191 (Iowa 1985).
133. Henry, 346 So. 2d at 157-58.

134. State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975, 981 (N.M. 1974).
135. See Brault v. Holleman, 230 S.E.2d 238, 244 (Va. 1976).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50: 503

Wisconsin Supreme Court has allowed its Governor to convert a check-off
provision for the state Election Campaign Fund into an obligation for the state's
general fund. 36 Both maneuvers resulted in a significant reformation of the
submitted bills, to the extent that the final products arguably were creations of
those governors rather than modified versions of the mechanisms established
by the legislatures. This is the philosophical leap which most characterizes
whether the balance of power tilts toward the governor. The Sego court
rejected this approach:
The power of partial veto is the power to disapprove.
This is a negative power, or a power to delete or destroy a
part or item, and is not a positive power, or a power to alter,
enlarge or increase the effect of the remaining parts or items.
It is not the power to enact or create new legislation by
selective deletions. Thus, a partial veto must be so exercised
that it eliminates or destroys the whole of an item or part and
does not distort the legislative intent, and in effect create
legislation inconsistent with that enacted by the Legislature,
by the careful
striking of words, phrases, clauses or
1 37
sentences.

Echoing the Sego court's reasoning, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected
an attempt by Governor Richard Lamm to extend his veto authority beyond the
bounds setby the state constitution. 38 In deciding ColoradoGeneralAssembly
v. Lamm, the court recognized the executive's legislative authority derived
from the veto. However, that authority is "merely a negative legislative
power-it vests in the governor the authority to nullify, but not to create
statutes."'139 Likewise, the Iowa Supreme Court struck the veto of a condition
in Rush v. Ray because "[t]he veto distorted the obvious legislative intent that
the funds only be spent for the appropriated purposes and created additional
ways the funds might be spent. This was use of the veto power to create rather
than negate." 1"
The Louisiana Supreme Court disallowed its Governor's elimination of
conditions from a spending bill because the legislature possessed the power to
include "qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on the expenditure

136. See State ex rel.Kleczka v. Conta, 264 N.W.2d 539, 540-41 (Wis. 1978).
137. Sego, 524 P.2d at 981 (citations omitted).
138. See Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1985). According
to the Colorado Constitution: "The governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items
of any bill making appropriations of money, embracing distinct items, and the part or parts of
the bill approved shall be law, and the item or items disapproved shall be void, [unless
overridden]." COLO.CONsT.art IV, § 12.
139. Lamm, 704 P.2d at 1382-83.
140. Rush v. Ray, 362 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Iowa 1985).
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of funds which would not be dealt with more properly in a separate bill." '' To
hold that the Governor could strike qualifications while leaving the
appropriation intact would give the executive the ability "to alter and thus, in
fact, to legislate by creating a new 'item' of appropriation wholly different in
nature and purpose from that originated in the legislature."' 4 2
In contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has consistently held a more
radical view of the Governor's power. Disregarding most courts' hesitancy in
tipping the balance of power toward the executive, the Wisconsin court
asserted in State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta43 that "because the Governor's power
to veto is coextensive with the legislature's power to enact laws initially, a
governor's partial veto may, and usually will, change the policy of the law."'"
In Kleczka, despite the fact that the veto transformed the legislation "from that
of encouraging add-ons to a taxpayer's personal liability to that of imposing a
charge on the general fund," this "change of policy" fell within the Governor's
constitutional authority "because his authority is coextensive with the authority
of the Legislature to enact the policy initially."' 45 In effect, the Wisconsin court
has abandoned any restrictions based on creation/negation while adhering to
the severability requirement.'"
A subtle version of the power to create legislation arose during adjustments
of the fiscal year 1991-92 Arizona budget.' 47 By striking items from two bills
amending the original budget, Governor Fife Symington effectively changed
the allocated amount by causing it to revert back to its value in the original
provision.' 4 In a sense, this is creating legislation. However, the state supreme
court held that the while the Governor could not "lin[e] out an item and
replac[e]it with his own, different amount," he could veto an amendment that
would change the amount through reversion.' 49 In precise terms, the court
explained:
[W]e reject the argument that because the net effect of the
Governor's vetoes is to increasestate spending, those vetoes
are per se invalid. Clearly, the net effect of the Governor's
vetoes is to allow expenditures greater than those allowed
under the Legislature's reduction plan. However, this is not

141. Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153, 157 (La. 1977).
142. Id.
143. 264 N.W.2d 539 (Wis. 1978).

144. Id. at 552.
145. Id.
146. "Under the Wisconsin Constitution, the Governor may exercise his partial-veto
power by removing provisos and conditions to an appropriation so long as the net result of the
partial veto is a complete, entire, and workable bill which the legislature itself could have passed
in the first instance." Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
147. Rios v. Symington, 833 P.2d 20 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc).
148. Id. at 27.
149. Id.
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a case . . . in which the Governor has added to an
appropriation in the sense that he has vetoed an item and
replaced it with his own, higher amount. Rather, the net
effect of the Governor's veto is to reinstate the amount
originallyappropriatedby the Legislature.'
In this special case, then, the Governor could create legislation as long as
the modification had been specifically approved by the legislature in a previous
bill. The effect was to give the Governor a choice between two amounts,
which, while creative to a certain extent, limits the discretion with which an
executive can reappropriate dollars.
The point of creation/negation is to temper the concept of severability, for
while a provision within a bill may easily be extracted, if the remainder differs
significantly from what the legislature originally intended, it will not stand.
Creation/negation is perhaps most closely tied to the concept of separation of
powers because, while it gives governors a role in the legislative process, it
places a distinct limit on that role. Ultimately, the item veto is a check on
legislative abuses more than it is a tool for gubernatorial lawmaking.'
V.

CONCLUSION

The role of the courts is central to the balance of power between the
branches as expressed through the line item veto. When courts interpret "item"
broadly, when "severability" is narrowly enforced, and when the governor is
given the power to create, the center of power shifts toward the executive. On
the other hand, when the integrity of legislative budgets is protected by limiting
the veto to clearly delineated items, the legislature maintains control over
perhaps the greatest power wielded at the state level, the power of the purse.
South Carolina has embraced a course favoring the General Assembly,
maintaining for its Governor a legislative role, but limiting that role through a
strict interpretation of Article IV, Section 21 of the South Carolina
Constitution. This arms-length budgetary oversight, wielded prudently by the
Governor and enforced consistently by the courts, is perhaps the state's greatest
insurance that the legislature performs this crucial responsibly.
Winston DavidHolliday, Jr.

150. Id. at 28.
151. See, e.g., id. at 23 ("The framers of the Constitution thus established an
additional executive check on the appropriation process, allowing the Executive to 'line out'
items of appropriation to which he or she objects.").
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